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THE RIGHT To BE ARRESTED:
BRITISH GOVERNMENT SUMMARY EXECUTIONS
JEANNE E. BISHOP *

I. INTRODUCTION

The right to life is the fundamental human right.' Its absence renders
all other rights meaningless. For example, if one may be summarily
executed, 2 one's right to free speech or a fair trial becomes irrelevant.
The right to life has implications for a government's treatment of
persons suspected of illegal activity. In that narrow sphere, the right
translates into a suspect's right to be arrested, charged and tried rather
than killed outright. In most of the United States, for instance, statutes
protect that right by severely limiting the circumstances under which
police may use deadly force against criminal suspects.'
In recent years, a number of unarmed persons, mostly Catholics, have
died at the hands of British security forces in Northern Ireland. Repeated
incidents have led some to allege that Britain has a "shoot-to-kill" policy
with respect to suspects in or from Northern Ireland whereby members of
security forces shoot these suspects instead of arrest them. 4
* Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Cook County (Ill.) Public Defender; Director
of Legal Justice Affairs, American Protestants for Truth About Ireland; B.S.J., 1981,
Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University; J.D., 1984, School of Law,
Northwestern University.

1. "The right [to life] . . . is the supreme right of the human being." View of the
United Nations Human Rights Committee Under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 31, 1982, 37 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 40) at 146, U.N. Doc. A/2905 (1982).
2. For purposes of this Article, "summary execution" means the killing of an individual
by a government without process of law. This Article does not consider killings by private
individuals or organizations except to the extent that such persons or groups act at the
direction of, or in collusion with, a government.
3. See, e.g., Wukitsch, Survey of the Law Governing Police Use of Deadly Force, 55
N.Y. ST. B.J. 12 (1983).
4. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS' INQUIRY INTO THE LETHAL USE OF FIREARMS
BY THE SECURITY FORCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, SHOOT TO KILL? 14 (1985) [hereinafter
SHOOT TO KILL?]. British officials have denied the existence of a shoot-to-kill policy. See,
e.g., Jennings, Shoot to Kill: The Final Courts of Justice, in JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: THE
ABUSE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 104 (A. Jennings ed. 1987) (quoting
James Prior, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland). The police in Northern Ireland, for
instance, issued a press release on July 6, 1988 stating, "How often does it have to be
stated that there never was such a policy or practice?" Northern Ireland Police Counter-
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Britain governs Northern Ireland. Irish nationalists, most of whom
are Catholic, seek freedom from British rule and unification of Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Loyalists, most of whom are
Protestants, desire continued British rule, devolved government or
independence.'
Both nationalists and loyalists have long decried the
absence of certain rights in British courts in Northern Ireland, such as the
absence of the right to silence and to trial by jury.6 Yet nationalists now
assert that they lack a more basic right: the right to get to court at all.
This Article considers the right to be arrested rather than killed
without legal process as it exists with respect to persons from Northern
Ireland. Section II of the Article sets forth the legal bases for such a
right.7 Section III discusses killings without legal process by British
security forces of persons from Northern Ireland and the investigations
that followed.' Section IV examines the British government's defense of
killings by the security forces.' The Article concludes that: (1) the
perception that Britain has a shoot-to-kill policy has a strong basis in fact;
(2) British government actions in response to investigations of killings lend
credibility to that perception; and (3) such a policy is contrary to both
international and British domestic law.
II.

LEGAL BASES FOR THE RIGHT TO LIFE

A.

InternationalLaw

Britain has voluntarily submitted itself to several international pacts
which prohibit summary execution. The United Nations International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the "Covenant") provides that
"[e]very human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
Attack over 'Shoot-to-Kill,' Reuters, July 6, 1988.
5. See generally S. CRONIN, IRISH NATIONALISM: A HISTORY OF ITS ROOTS AND
IDEOLOGY (1980); 0. MACDONAGH, STATES OF MIND: A STUDY OF ANGLO-IRISH
CONFLICT 1780-1980 (1983); P. O'MALLEY, THE UNCIVIL WARS: IRELAND TODAY (1983);
C. RICE, DIVIDED IRELAND (1985).
6. The British Parliament enacted a law in 1988 which permits judges to draw a
negative inference from an accused's failure to answer questions while in custody.
Criminal Evidence (N. Ir.) Order, 1988, § 3. Persons in Northern Ireland who commit
offenses characterized as "scheduled offenses" are tried in so-called "Diplock courts,"
which have one judge and no jury. See generally S.C. GREER & A. WHITE, ABOLISHING
THE DIPLOCK COURTS (1986); R. HARVEY, DIPLOCK AND THE ASSAULT ON CIVIL
LIBERTIES (Haldane Soc'y of Socialist Lawyers Report No. 1, 1981).
7. See infra notes 10-36 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 37-133 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 134-51 and accompanying text.
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protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." 10
The European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (the "Convention") provides:
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No-one
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the
execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction
for a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in
contravention of this article when it results from the use of
force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a)

in defense of any person from unlawful violence;

(b)

in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent
the escape of a person lawfully detained;

(c)

in action lawfully taken for the purposes of
quelling a risk of insurrection. 1

Britain has ratified both the Covenant and the Convention. Yet even
if it had not, the general prohibition against summary executions contained
in other international laws still apply to it. A United Nations resolution
concerning summary executions describes article 6 of the Covenant as
expressing a "minimum standard" for all member states, not only ratifying
states.12 Consistent with that standard, the Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979
limits the ability of law enforcement officers to kill suspects, permitting
them to "use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required
for the performance of their duty.""
Britain is also subject to non-treaty sources of international law:
international custom (i.e., practices which states accept as legally binding);
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; judicial
decisions; legal scholarship; and resolutions of universal international
10. In force Mar. 23, 1976, art. 6, pars. 1, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter International Covenant], reprinted in
BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 270, 273 (I. Brownlie ed. 1983).
11. In force Sept. 3, 1953, art. 2, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 320, 321.
12. G.A. Res. 35/172, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 195, U.N: Doe. A/35/48 (1980).
13. G.A. Res. 34/169, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 185, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
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organizations that state the rule as international law, if adopted by
consensus or virtual unanimity. 4 The author is aware of no source of
international law which condones summary executions.
Both the Convention and the Covenant feature a mechanism known as
derogation, by which a ratifying state can indicate its intention not to
comply with particular provisions. The provisions forbidding summary
execution, however, are considered so important that no country may
derogate from them except during wartime, and then only under certain
conditions. Article 15 of the Convention provides that no party may
derogate from provisions forbidding summary execution "except in respect
of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war." 15 Article 4 of the Covenant
contains a similar provision. 6
Britain is currently in derogation from article 5(3) of the Convention 7 and from article 9(3) of the Covenant"8 to avoid violations based
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 103(2) comment c (1986).
15.

European Convention, supra note 11, art. 15, para. 2.

16. International Covenant, supra note 10, art. 4.
17. AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS IN WESTERN EUROPE 64
(May-Oct. 1990). Article 5(3) of the Convention provides:
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
l(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within
a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by
guarantees to appear for trial.
European Convention, supra note 11, art. 5, para. 3.
The derogation followed a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights that
Britain had violated article 5(3) of the Convention by arresting and detaining four men from
Northern Ireland for various time periods (from four days and six hours to six days and
sixteen hours) without bringing them before a judge. See Brogan & Others v. United
Kingdom, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988); see also Note, Pre-Trial Detention of
Suspects in Northern Ireland: A Violation of Fundamental Human Rights, 11 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 297 (1990); Whitney, Britain, Citing Ulster Terrorism, Keeps
Detention, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1988, at A4, col. 1.
18. Britain derogated in 1976 from articles 9, 10(2), 10(3), 12(1), 14, 17, 19(2), 21 and
22 of the Covenant. In 1984, Britain withdrew its derogations from all the foregoing
provisions. In 1988, Britain derogated from article 9(3) in aftermath of the Brogan case.
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/8/Add.I at 157-58.
Article 9(3) of the Covenant provides:
Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the
general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release
may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial
proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement.
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on Britain's actions in Northern Ireland. These derogations, however, do
not excuse Britain from complying with other articles of the Convention
and the Covenant, including the right-to-life provisions. Britain is
therefore prohibited from carrying out summary executions not only under
the "minimum standard" set by United Nations resolution, but also under
provisions of human rights treaties from which it has not formally
derogated.
B. Domestic Law
Britain has no written constitution guaranteeing the right not to be
deprived of one's life without legal process. 9 It does, however, have
laws limiting the amount of force which can be used in apprehending
persons suspected of illegal activity."
Under feudal law, anyone breaching feudal obligations could be killed
without regard to whether he could be captured instead. 2' It was
irrelevant if the suspect was killed in the process of capture since by
breaching his obligations he had already forfeited his life.' Breachers
of feudal obligations punished by this sort of killing were known as
felons.'
English common law adopted the term "felon" to describe one who
commits serious offenses against the Crown. 24 Only a few crimes, all of
Law enforcement
which involved force or violence, were felonies.'
officers could arrest anyone reasonably suspected of having committed a
felony (if a felony had in fact been committed) or anyone committing a
Deadly force was permissible to effect
felony in their presence.'
International Covenant, supra note 10, art. 9, para. 3.
19. The right of British subjects are "residual," that is, individuals have the right under
an unwritten "constitution" to do whatever is not prohibited by law. See E.C.S. WADE &
G. GODFREY PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 441 (1977).

"[1n

the constitution of this country, there are no guaranteed or absolute rights. The safeguard
of British liberty is in the good sense of the people and in the system of representation and
responsible government which has been evolved." Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A.C.
206, 261, [19411 All E.R. 338.
20. See Harper, Accountabiliy of Law Enforcement Officers in the Use of Deadly Force,
26 HOWARD L. J. 119, 122-24 (1983).
21.

Id.at 122.

22. Id.
23. Id.

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.at 122-23.
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arrests. 27
At common law, an offense other than treason or a felony was a
misdemeanor.' Officers were not permitted to use deadly force to effect
misdemeanor arrests since the interest in effecting such arrests was not as
vital as the interest in apprehending felons.'
In 1967, the common law standard was altered by the Criminal Law
Act, section 3(i) of which provides that "a person may use such force as
is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in
effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected
There is no statutory
offenders or of persons unlawfully at large."'
definition of the circumstances in which a person, including members of
British forces, may use deadly force.
Decisions of Northern Ireland courts have done little to clarify the
circumstances under which deadly force would be unreasonable. Northern
Ireland judges, acting without juries, have acquitted members of the
security forces charged with murder on the basis of their suspicion that the
victim was a "terrorist."31
British security forces have received a set of instructions called a
"yellow card" on the use of weapons in apprehending suspects.32 The
instructions state that firearms must only be used as a last resort; a
challenge must be given before opening fire.33 The card also states that
British forces may only open fire if a person "is committing or about to
commit an act likely to endanger life and there is no other way to prevent
The
the danger" or if "there is no other way to make an arrest."'
27. Id. at 123.
28. Id. at 124.
29. Id.
30. Criminal Law Act, § 3(i) (N. Ir. 1967).

31. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
32. See Harper, supra note 20, at 72-78.

33. Id.
34. Instructions for Opening Fire in Northern Ireland, Army Code No. 70771
(restricted) (the "1980 Yellow Card"), reprinted in SHOOT TO KILL?, supra note 4, at 7576. The text of the 1980 Yellow Card is as follows:
RESTRICTED
Army Code No. 70771
Instructions for Opening Fire in Northern Ireland
General Rules
1. In all situations you are to use the minimum force necessary. FIREARMS
MUST ONLY BE USED AS A LAST RESORT.
2. Your weapon must always be made safe: that is, NO live round is to be
carried in the breech and in the case of automatic weapons the working parts
are to be forward, unless you are ordered to carry a live round in the breech
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memoirs of a British army captain who served in Northern Ireland state,
however, that "people are willing to turn a blind eye to any infringements
of the letter of the yellow card." 3" That view is borne out by decisions
of Northern Ireland courts which interpreted yellow card instructions as
mere "guidelines" rather than legally binding limitations.'
III. KILLINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS

There have been civilian deaths at the hands of British security forces
since Northern Ireland's inception in 1919.1' This Article, however, will
or you are about to fire.
Challenging
3. A challenge MUST be given before opening fire unless:
a. to do so would increase the risk of death or grave injury to you or
any other person.
b. you or others in the immediate vicinity are being engaged by
terrorists.
4. You are to challenge by shouting:
ARMY: STOP OR I FIRE or words to that effect.
Opening Fire
5. You may only open fire against a person:
a. if he is committing or about to commit an act LIKELY TO ENDANGER LIFE AND THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO PREVENT THE DANGER. The following are some examples of acts
where life could be endangered, dependent always upon the
circumstances:
(1) firing or being about to fire a weapon.
(2) planting detonating or throwing an explosive device including
a petrol bomb.
(3) deliberately driving a vehicle at a person and there is no
other way of stopping him.
b. if you know that he has just killed or injured any person by such
means and he does not surrender if challenged and THERE IS NO
OTHER WAY TO MAKE AN ARREST.
6. If you have to open fire you should:
a. fire only aimed shouts,
b. fire no more rounds than are necessary,
c. take all reasonable precautions not to injure any one other than your
target.
35. A.F.N. CLARKE, CONTACT 98 (1983). Clarke writes, "Sure as hell, if I see some
bastard with a gun, I'm not about to ask him to surrender. Shoot first, then ask questions
after." Id.
36. See, e.g., R. v. MacNaughton, [19751 N. fr. 203; R. v. ]ones, [1975] 2 N.I.J.B.
82.
37. See generally J. O'BRIEN, BRITISH BRUTAUTY IN IRELAND (1989). This Article
does not discuss deaths caused by plastic or rubber bullets fired by British security forces.
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focus only on deaths which have occurred since Britain dispatched army
troops to Northern Ireland in 1969. The treatment of killings discussed
below is not meant to be exhaustive; rather, it serves to illustrate the
circumstances in which such killings have occurred and the typical
aftermath.
A. ParticularIncidents and Government Investigations
1. Bloody Sunday
On January 30, 1972, thirteen unarmed civilians were killed during
a public demonstration in Londonderry, 3" Northern Ireland.3 9 British
army troops blocked the marchers, and a lieutenant fired unprovoked shots
into the crowd.' When demonstrators panicked and tried to flee, troops
fired on the crowd."1 No gunfire was returned against the British army.
When the shooting ceased, thirteen Catholic men were dead; six victims
were seventeen years old. One man was shot as he went to the aid of the
wounded carrying a white flag in one hand. 2
An investigating body, the Widgery Tribunal, was formed to examine
the killings.43 Testimony before the tribunal established that troops
operated under a plan approved by a British general." It was suggested
that the plan was to open fire on any troublemakers in hopes of flushing
out Irish Republican Army (IRA) gunmen returning fire and to continue
Seventeen people in Northern Ireland have died after being shot with such bullets; only one
of the victims was Protestant. AM. PROTESTANTS FOR TRUTH ABOUT IR., NORTHERN
IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 8-9 (Nov. 20, 1989); see also ASS'N FOR LEGAL JUST.,
2ND INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL OF INQUIRY INTO DEATHS AND INJURIES BY PLASTIC
BULLETS (Oct. 1982), reprinted in 8 Hum. Rts. Internet Rep. 551 (Apr.-June 1983).
38. The legal name given by Britain to Northern Ireland's second largest city
"Londenderry," although the Republic of Ireland and many of the city's residents refer
it as "Derry." The City Council of the city voted several years ago to change its name
the "Derry City Council." Interview with David Davies, Mayor of Londonderry,
Londonderry, N. Ir. (Mar. 30, 1990).

is
to
to
in

39. M. FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE 288 (1976).

40. Id. at 289.
41. Id.

42. Id.
43. REPORT OF THE TRIBUNAL APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE EVENTS ON SUNDAY,
30TH JANUARY 1972, WHICH LED TO THE Loss OF LIFE IN CONNECTION WITH THE
PROCESSION IN LONDONDERRY ON THAT DAY, 1972, H.L. 101, H.C. 220 [hereinafter
WIDGERY REPORT].

44. id. at 6.
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firing in the area where gunmen were thought likely to appear."5 The
troops carried out the operation despite the absence of two circumstances
anticipated by the plan: there were no troublemakers and no IRA gunmen.
The tribunal concluded that "there was no general breakdown in
discipline" of the troops; they acted according to orders. ' No British
soldier was charged with any crime in connection with the killings.4 7
2. 1982 Killings
During a three-week period in 1982, the Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC), Northern Ireland's police force, killed six unarmed Catholic men
in three separate incidents. 48 A Catholic civil rights lawyer, Patrick
Finucane, represented some members of the victims' families in their
attempt to seek legal redress for the killings.49 In 1983, four RUC
officers were charged with the murder of two of the men." All four
were acquitted in 1984, in courts without juries.5"
In May 1984, the British government assigned Manchester deputy
chief constable John Stalker to head an inquiry into charges that the RUC
murdered the six men.52 Stalker's investigation uncovered a police
practice of lying in court to conceal contradictory information and
fabrication of evidence. After two years of investigation, Stalker said he
had enough evidence to suspect the killings were the "act of a Central
53
American assassination squad-truly of a police force out of control."
Just as the investigation reached the point of establishing obstruction of
justice, the government removed Stalker from the inquiry.' He quit the
police force in 1987. 55 Discussing his investigation in his autobiography,
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id. at 39.
47. Id. at 38-39.
48. B. ROWTHORN & N. WAYNE, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
CONFLICT 58 (1988).

49. See generally INT'L ASS'N OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS, LEGAL DEFENCE IN
NORTHERN IRELAND FOUOWING THE MURDER OF PATRICK FINUCANE, REPORT OF AN
INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION OF LAWYERS (1989). Finucane himself was shot and killed

in his own home in 1989 by loyalists. Id.; see also Whitney, Sectarian Killings in Ulster
Continue to Mount, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1989, at A6, col. 1.

50. B. ROWTHORN & N. WAYNE, supra note 48, at 58.
51.

Id. at 58-59.

52. J.STALKER, STALKER 9, 22-25, 284 (1988).
53. Id.at 67.
54. Id.at 9, 114, 287.
55. Id.at 237-52, 289.
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Stalker writes, "[t]he circumstances of those shootings pointed to a police
inclination, if not a policy, to shoot suspects dead without warning rather
than to arrest them. Coming, as these incidents did, so close together, the
On
suspicion of deliberate assassination was not unreasonable."'
stating, "I'm a hard-nosed copper,
another occasion, he was even blunter,
57
but I draw the line at murder. "

The inquiry concluded under Stalker's replacement, Colin Sampson,
but resulted in no prosecutions. 8 Sampson concluded that there was "no
evidence that there were instructions to any police officers in Northern
Ireland to use other than legitimate methods to bring offenders to
In March 1989, eighteen policemen implicated in the
justice. "I
investigation received minor reprimands.'
3. Thomas Reilly
In 1984, a fracas developed when a group of Irish youths were
sunbathing in Belfast. A British soldier shot and killed a Catholic band
manager, Thomas Reilly, as he ran away. 6
The soldier, Pvt. Ian Thain, became the first British soldier convicted
of murder while on duty in Northern Ireland.62 Thain was sentenced to
life imprisonment.' In February 1988, however, it was disclosed that
Thain had been released from prison after serving less than three years of
his sentence and had returned to his regiment.'
4. Aidan McAnespie
On February 21, 1988, Aidan McAnespie, twenty-three years old, was
walking unarmed to a football match when a British soldier shooting from
56. Id. at 253.
57. A Policeman's Story: Mauled in the 'Jungle' of Northern Ireland, Associated Press,
Feb. 15, 1988.
58. No Action Against Police Chief Over Shooting Allegations, Associated Press, June

29, 1988.
59. Id. In February 1988, the European Parliament voted by a 181-51 vote to call
Britain to re-examine its decision not to prosecute. Europarliament Condemns Britain in
Irish Security Row, Reuters, Feb. 9, 1988.
60. Man Killed in Ambush, Officers Reprimanded Over 1982 Deaths, Associated Press,
Mar. 14, 1989.
61.

AMNESTY

"SUPERGRASS"

INT'L,

NORTHERN IRELAND:

KILLINGS BY SECURITY

FORCES AND

TRIALS 44-45, EUR 45/08/88 (U.K.) (1988) [hereinafter AMNESTY

KILLINGS REPORT].

62. Convicted Soldier Back, N.Y. Newsday, Feb. 24, 1988, at 12, col. 4.

63. Id.
64. Id.
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an observation post killed him.' A police investigation found that one
of three shots fired had bounced off the road and hit McAnespie in the
back.'
McAnespie's family said soldiers had repeatedly threatened his life
The soldier, David Holden, said a heavy
prior to the shooting."
machine gun slipped from his hands and discharged accidentally. 6" Irish
prime minister Charles Haughey charged that Holden's explanation "must
give rise to disbelief." '
Manslaughter charges were brought against Holden but were
dropped. 70 The British army fined him and returned him to full duty
with his regiment.71
5. Gibraltar
In March 1988, soldiers from an undercover unit of the British army
called the Special Air Services (SAS) shot and killed two Irish men and
an Irish woman in a public street in Gibraltar. 2 The IRA later acknowledged that the three people were IRA members.'
The next day the British foreign secretary, Goeffrey Howe, admitted
to the House of Commons that the three were unarmed and that there were
no explosives in the car they had parked earlier in the day. 7' Howe said
they made movements which led the SAS to fear for their lives.75
Eyewitnesses, however, said two were shot with their hands in the air,
apparently trying to surrender.76 When the victims fell to the ground,
65. Thomas, Bloody Ireland, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May-June 1988, at 36.
66. Soldier Who Killed Catholic in Northern Ireland Returns to Duty, Reuters, June 25,

1989 [hereinafter Soldier Who Killed Catholic].
67. AMNESTY KILLINGS REPORT, supra note 61, at 58; see also Thomas, supra note 65,
at 36 ("Aiden MeAnespie .. . had been frequently interrogated and occasionally beaten by
soldiers when he crossed the border each day to go to work ...
68. Soldier Who Killed Catholic, supra note 66.
69. Haughey Says Border Death Explanation Gives Rise to Disbelief, Reuters, Mar. 1,
1988. Haughey said McAnespie's killing and similar incidents "have combined to create
the impression that the security forces are above the law." Id.

70. Soldier Who Killed Catholic, supra note 66.
71. Id.
72. AMNESTY INT'L, INVESTIGATING LETHAL SHOOTINGS: THE GIBRALTAR INQUEST 1,
EUR 45/02/89, (U.K.) (Apr. 18, 1989) [hereinafter AMNESTY GIBRALTAR INQUEST].

Id.at 5.
74. Id.
75. Id.
73.

76. Id.at 17.
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eyewitnesses said, SAS soldiers continued to fire shots into their
bodies.'
The human rights organization Amnesty International, in a
letter to British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, condemned the
shooting as "extrajudicial executions."78
In September 1988, a coroner's inquest into the killings in Gibraltar
convened. 9 The British government was permitted, in the name of
security, to bar all inquiry into the decision to send an SAS regiment from
England to arrest three people when a battalion of Royal Anglians were
already in Gibraltar.' The SAS soldiers, who did not have to give their
identity, testified they were within arresting distance of all three."1 They
admitted they had given no warning.' One soldier testified he had fired
to kill because that was the way he was trained; another testified that once
firing began, the intention was to kill all three victims.' The jury at the
inquest deadlocked and were instructed to reach a majority verdict.' On
September 30, 1988, the jury returned a verdict of lawful killing.8 5
B. Extending the Boundaries
Tom King, former British secretary of state for Northern Ireland,
stated on March 15, 1988, that "steps have been taken to ensure that the
events that resulted in the Stalker/Sampson investigation will not occur
again."' Yet in recent years several killings in Northern Ireland have
indicated not only that suspicious deaths are continuing to occur but also
that the types of circumstances in which suspicious deaths occur are
expanding rather than contracting. These new circumstances involve the
77. Id.
78. Letter from Amnesty International to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
(Mar. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Amnesty Letter]. Amnesty International pointed out that the

fact that the three shooting victims were IRA guerrillas did not justify British troops'
conduct in killing rather than capturing them. Id.; see also K.D. EWING & C.A. GEARTY,
FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER 235 (1990) (calling the Gibraltar incident "the most dramatic

and controversial 'shoot to kill' to date").
79. AMNESTY GIBRALTAR INQUEST, supra note 72, at 9.
80. Id. at 2.
81. Id. § 4.2.2, at 14.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. § 5.4, at 30.
85. Id. § 4.2.5, at 20.
86. Amnesty Int'l, Amnesty International Calls for Comprehensive Inquiry into the Use
of Lethal Force by Northern Ireland Security Forces 3, U.S. News Release (June 27,
1988).
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direct participation of and allegations of collusion by the security forces.
1. Loyalist Paramilitary Assassinations
Between August and October 1989, loyalist paramilitary groups made
public the names, addresses, and, in some cases, photographs of more
than 400 Catholics in Northern Ireland." The documents were leaked
from files maintained by British security forces."8 Several people whose
names were leaked were killed by loyalists.8 9 The British government
and police denied charges of collusion.'
In September 1989, the British government launched an investigation
known as the Stevens Inquiry into collusion allegations. 91 During the
inquiry, approximately sixty people were questioned and thirty people
charged with offenses, twenty-eight of whom were members of the Ulster
Defence Regiment (UDR), a locally-recruited unit comprised mostly of
Northern Ireland Protestants.' No members of the RUC were charged,
despite the fact that the leaked information came from RUC files. Only
two members of the security forces were charged in connection with the
inquiry; both were members of the UDR.3 The findings of the Stevens
Inquiry were not made public.'
2. Graveyard Killings
On the eve of St. Patrick's Day 1988, about 5,000 mourners gathered
in Belfast's Milltown Cemetery to bury the three victims of the Gibraltar
killings. 95 The heavy police and army presence usually surrounding
nationalist funerals was absent.'
87. Flanders, Who Leaked the Lists? Northern Ireland Hit-Squad Scandal, NATION,
Oct. 30, 1989, at 491.

88. Id.
89. Id.

90. Id.
91. Brooke Tells a Tale: Stevens Report Goes to Annesley, An Phoblacht (Dublin), Apr.
12, 1990, at 4, col. 1 [hereinafter Brooke Tells a Tale).
92. Flanders, supra note 87, at 492.

93. Brooke Tells a Tale, supra note 91, at 4.
94. Id.
95. Reed, Terror in the Cemetery: An IRA Funeral Brings Death, Another Funeraland
More Deaths, TIME, Mar. 28, 1988, at 34; Clines, Gunman Terrorizes Belfast Crowd at
Rites for 3 Guerrillas, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1988, at Al, col. 2; see supra notes 72-85
and accompanying text.
96. Reed, supra note 95, at 34.
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As the coffins were being lowered into graves, a loyalist attacker
threw grenades and fired shots into the crowd.9 7 Three people died and
sixty were injured.9 No police appeared on the scene during the assault;
they arrived only when a group of mourners pursued, captured and began
Witnesses suggested that Stone
beating the gunman, Michael Stone.'
had accomplices who escaped in a van even though an army checkpoint
was set up along the nearest possible escape route."

Nationalists alleged that the coincidence of the unusually low profile
by the security forces with the attack was evidence of their collusion in the
killing. 10 1 British officials responded that the forces were complying
with repeated requests by nationalists not to intrude upon funerals."°
3. Killing of Ordinary Thieves
On January 13, 1990, a British army undercover squad shot and killed
three men who were holding up a bookmaker's shop in Belfast.1 3 None
of the three had paramilitary connections; one of them previously had been
the target of IRA punishment shooting for his criminal activity. "o The
men were unarmed, although two of them carried replica weapons. 0 '
Eyewitnesses said the soldiers gave no warning or call for surrender."
They also said soldiers shot two of the men while they were standing and
fired more shots into their bodies as they lay wounded on the ground."17
Soldiers shot the third man without warning as he sat in the getaway
97. Id.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100. See Attacker Kills 3, Wounds 50 at I.R.A. Funeral in Belfast, Wash. Post, Mar.
17, 1988, at Al, col. 2. A New York Times editorial stated that the graveyard incident
"may yet have a redeeming affect if it awakens Britain's Prime Minister, Margaret
Thatcher, to the baleful succession of calamities involving British police." The Wearing
of the Black, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1988, at A30, col. I (editorial). The editorial cited
the Gibraltar killings and the Stalker affair and concluded, "Yesterday's graveyard carnage
makes inescapable the need for her to act, finally, with sensitivity and urgency." Id.
101. Reed, supra note 95, at 34.

102. Id.
103. Hearst, Independent Inquiry Urged After Ulster Raid Shootings, The Guardian
(London), Jan. 15, 1990, at 1, col. 1.

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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car.10
On January 14, 1990, a spokesman for Britain's Northern Ireland
Office said he knew of no plans for an inquiry into the killings."o The
British soldiers who shot the men were not suspended from duty, nor were
their names revealed to the public."'
4. Shooting Deaths of Teenage Joyriders
On September 30, 1990, British soldiers shot three teenagers joyriding
Two teenagers were killed; one was
in a stolen car in West Belfast.'
wounded but survived. 2 Northern Ireland security minister John Cope
and Northern Ireland secretary Peter Brooke said the three were shot
because they had driven through an army roadblock." 3 The British
government established an RUC inquiry into the incident, but rejected
public calls for an independent investigation. Brooke said the soldiers
"should have the right to expect a police inquiry . . . rather than
everybody in the community presuming to make judgments on what their
actions were."" 4 The public's request arose from the wide discrepancy
between the security forces' account of the shootings and the accounts of
eyewitnesses. Witnesses said there was no checkpoint." 5
At a mass for the two dead teenagers, Canon Brendan McGee asked,
"Why were trained professionals not able to disable the car and thus avoid
directly killing two of its occupants? In the last analysis, everyone who
uses a firearm on his neighbor has to answer to God. But citizens of a
democratic state require from their civil authorities, in addition, that
suspicion and mistrust be absent from all affairs of state."" 6
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Killing Soldiers Are Still on Duty-Adams, Ir. News (Belfast), Feb. 16, 1990, at
5, col. 3; see also Barr, Questions Abound in N. Ireland Afier Three Shootings by British,
Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 17, 1990, at A3, col. 4.
111. Brooke Defends Soldiers Over Joyrider Deaths, The Independent (London), Oct.
3, 1990, at 2, col. 6 [hereinafter Brooke Defends Soldiers].
112. Id.
113. Id.; Boyle, Soldiers 'Lying About the Death Roadblock,' Ir. News (Belfast), Oct.
5, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
114. Brooke Defends Soldiers, supra note 11l, at 2, col. 6; see also O'Halloran, Brooke
Rejects Killings Inquiry, Ir. Times (Dublin), Oct. 3, 1990, at 2, col. 1.
115. Witness Disputes Checkpoint Claim, Ir. Times (Dublin), Oct. 5, 1990, at 4, col.
3. The injured survivor of the shooting said she had seen no soldiers until after the
shooting began. Id.
116. Distraught Families Bury Shot Teenagers, Ir. News (Belfast), Oct. 4, 1990, at 2,
col. 5.
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C. Independent Investigations

Legal and human rights experts have conducted their own investigations of shooting deaths in Northern Ireland caused by British security
forces.
1. The International Lawyers' Inquiry
In 1984, an international panel of lawyers went to Northern Ireland
to investigate claims of the existence of a shoot-to-kill policy. 7 The
panel found that the number of civilians shot dead by security forces in
Northern Ireland was "unacceptable" and that the law governing the use
of deadly force by the police and army in Northern Ireland is "inadequate.""'
The panel criticized judges in Northern Ireland and the
British House of Lords for interpreting the law in a manner which allows
too much scope for members of9 the security forces, calling it a virtual
"endorsement of martial law.""' It also criticized the security forces
for allowing internal army and police instructions on the use of firearms
to be kept secret from the public and allowing breaches of those instructions to go unpunished. "o
The panel found the procedures for investigating questionable killings
by the security forces ineffective.'
It found coroners' inquests to be
unreasonably delayed and the scope of their inquiry too narrow."'z It
also found that political considerations have influenced the decision
whether to prosecute in a number of cases, and that such influence is
"improper. 123
The panel concluded:
The continuing failure of successive British Parliaments to bring
domestic law into line with Article 6(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, to both of which the United Kingdom is a party,
reflects an administrative policy and practice which seeks to place
117. See SHOOT TO KILL?, supra note 4, at 10; see also Thomas, In Ulster, the 'Shoot
to Kill' Rumors Will Not Die, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1986, at A2, col. 2.
118. SHOOT TO KILL?, supra note 4, general findings 224-25, at 125.
119. Id. geheral finding 225, at 125.

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. general finding 226, at 126.
Id.
Id.

1990]

BRITISH GOVERNMENT SUMMARY EXECUTIONS

the security forces outside the law.
While the Nationalist (and predominantly Roman Catholic)
community makes up approximately 40% of Northern Ireland's
population, members of this community account for the vast
majority of civilians killed by the security forces. By contrast,
less than 10% of the security forces come from the Catholic
community. We find that this community suffers disproportionately from the unrestrained use of firearms by the security forces
and the Nationalists have become especially alienated from the
administration of justice.
We conclude that the British government has a clear and immediate duty to introduce legislation complying with the United
Nations Covenant and the European Convention and to institute
genuinely independent machinery for investigating and prosecuting unlawful killings by the security forces.
If the British Government fails or refuses to act, we believe that
the Government of Ireland would be justified in referring
Britain's violations of the European Commission on Human
Rights in Strasbourg."2
2. Amnesty International
Amnesty International conducted an investigation and prepared a
report in 1988 calling for a British judicial inquiry on killings by security
forces in Northern Ireland.'25
Citing twenty-five deaths since 1982 of unarmed people at the hands
of security forces, Amnesty's report stated that an inquiry was "vital to
ensure that effective procedures and safeguards are instituted" to prevent
"unlawful killings.""
It called existing rules "inadequate in enforcing
exacting standards for the behavior of security forces to prevent the

excessive use of lethal force. "127

Amnesty noted that Britain admitted that Northern Ireland police
officers tried to pervert the course of justice, but that for "national
security" reasons no one would be prosecuted.""
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. general findings 227-30, at 126.
AMNESTY KILLINGS REPORT, supra

ld. at 60.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 4.

note 61, at 1.
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The report also noted that most unarmed victims of police and army
shootings since 1982 were Catholics and that some belonged to nationalist
paramilitary organizations."

Amnesty's report stated that regardless of

the fact that the security forces were often targets of military attack, "the
rule of law does not permit the exclusion of any citizen from the criminal
justice system.""'
The report complained that since prosecutions of members of the
security forces were so rare, coroners' inquests were one of the few
methods of discovering the truth about a disputed death. 3 ' The report,
however, stated that the coroner's inquest "is so severely restricted that
it cannot serve as a mechanism for investigating the full circumstances
surrounding any incident of killing." 32
The British government refused to set up a judicial inquiry in response
to the report, contending that the police and army were equipped to
investigate disputed incidents.' 3 3
IV. BRITAIN'S DEFENSE
Britain has advanced several arguments in defense of killings by the
security forces.
A. The "Bad Apple" Argument

The "bad apple" argument posits that killings are the work of an
individual soldier or police officer run amok rather than the result of
official policy. Under this argument, the death of an Irish person results
from a soldier's disobedience of, rather than obedience to, orders from
above.
Evidence surrounding several killings refutes that notion. Some
members of British forces not only have not been punished for taking Irish
lives; they have been commended."
Nine months after the Bloody
Sunday killings, the officer commanding the regiment that day was
awarded the Order of the British Empire.'35 One judge who heard a
case against an officer involved praised him for bringing the men he killed
129. Id. at 42-58.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 59.
132. Id.
133. JudicialProbe Demanded into Disputed Killings by Police, Associated Press, June

28, 1988.
134. J.O'BRIEN, supra note 37, at 106.
135. Id.
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to "the final court of justice. " "
Evidence about orders given to officers who caused disputed deaths
does not indicate an intention to capture rather than kill. The Widgery
Tribunal inquiry into the events of Bloody Sunday suggested an advance
plan to flush out and shoot IRA gunmen.' 37 The SAS squad that killed
three unarmed Irish people in Gibraltar testified at an inquest that their
orders were to kill once firing began. 3 ' Those instructions were echoed
by RUC officers during their trial on murder charges in connection with
the 1982 killings. An RUC deputy chief constable testified that "[o]nce
decided to fire, you shoot to take out your enemy [permanentyou have
39
ly]. "1
A description by civil rights leader Bernadette Devlin McAliskey of
the 1981 attempt on her life is illustrative. According to Ms. McAliskey,
British soldiers lay outside her house on the morning that loyalist gunmen
burst in and riddled her body with bullets."4 Soldiers entered the house
after the shooting. 4 1 Wounded but still conscious, she asked one soldier
why the army had not stopped armed men from breaking into her
home. 42 The soldier reglied that his orders were to arrest the men
coming out of the house.'
B. The "Special Circumstances" Argument
The "special circumstances" argument holds that British forces operate
44
in conditions justifying departure from ordinary laws and procedures?
136. R. v. Montgomery, [1984] 4 N.I.J.B. 65; Johnson, Judge Praises RUC 'Justice,'
The Guardian (London), June 6, 1984, at 2, col. 2. In R. v. Robinson, Lord Justice
MacDermott praised RUC constable John Robinson at his trial for the murder of an
unarmed man from Armagh, Northern Ireland, for Robinson's sharpshooting. [1984] 4
N.I.J.B. 65. Robinson was acquitted. Id.; Johnson, RUC Man Cleared of Unarmed
Suspect's Murder, The Guardian (London), Apr. 4, 1984, at 1, col. 8.
137. WIDGERY REPORT, supra note 43, at 8.
138. J. O'BRIEN, supra note 37, at 114.
139. SHOOT TO KILL?, supra note 4, at 92 (testimony of Deputy Chief Constable
Michael McAtamney).
140. Interview with Bernadette Devlin MeAliskey, in Chicago, Ill. (Sept. 28, 1989)
[hereinafter McAliskey Interview]; see also W.D. FLACKES & S. ELLIOT, NORTHERN

IRELAND: A POLITICAL DIRECTORY 1968-88, at 176-78 (3d ed. 1989). It should be noted
that one of Ms. McAliskey's attackers denied any collusion with British security forces in
connection with the attempted assassination. Interview with Attacker, in Lisburn, N. Ir.
(Mar. 29, 1990) (name of attacker withheld to protect identity).
141. McAliskey Interview, supra note 140.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See J. STALKER, supra note 52, at 11, 71.
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The argument contends that defeating paramilitary violence requires
allowing greater latitude in conduct by the security forces. 45
The problem with this argument is its inconsistency with Britain's
position on the nature of the Northern Ireland conflict. British officials
have stated that persons who engage in paramilitary violence are common
criminals governed by criminal law rather than the laws of war."4 At
the same time, Britain has contended that there is a "war situation" in
Northern Ireland to which ordinary criminal laws should not be applied. 47 Britain cannot have it both ways.
C. The "Suspected Terrorist"Argument

The "suspected terrorist" argument maintains that killings were
justified because the victims allegedly had connections to paramilitaries or
allegedly intended to commit so-called "terrorist" acts.' 48 The killings
were necessary, the argument goes, to prevent those acts from being
committed. 49
'
One problem with this view is the potential for the abuse it creates.
The Stalker investigation, for example, revealed police attempts to
fabricate evidence of paramilitary connections in the case of one unarmed
person killed by police."tS
The deeper problem is why suspected
paramilitary ties matter when a suspect can be arrested rather than killed.5
Under British law, a suspect is deemed innocent until proven guilty.1 1
145. id.
146. Indeed, Britain's position on this point was the catalyst for the 1981 hunger strike
in which 10 nationalist prisoners died. Britain claimed the men were criminals who should
be required to wear prison uniforms and do prison work. The hunger strikers asserted that
they were political prisoners of war to whom requirements applicable to common criminals
should not apply. See generally B. BERESFORD, TEN MEN DEAD (1987); T. COLUNS, THE
IRISH HUNGER STRIKE (1987).
147. Remarks of John Matthew, Prosecutor, at the Trial of William Quinn, Feb. 12,
1988 (author's notes at trial) (Quinn was the first United States citizen to be extradited to
Britain for a political offense.). Prosecutors argued at Quinn's trial that the government's
failure to follow identification procedures under British law in Quinn's case were excusable
because there was a "war situation" in Northern Ireland in which "lives were at stake."
Id. Thejudge agreed. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986); see also R.
v. Jones, [1975] 2 N.I.J.B. 82 (Mr. Justice MacDermott holding that one of the
circumstances justifying a soldier's use of deadly force was the -general wartime situation
in Northern Ireland").
148. See Amnesty Letter, supra note 78.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes.52-60 and accompanying text.
151. ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EvIDENCE& PRACTICE IN CRIMINALCASES 659-60, pare.
1154.(1) (S. Mitchell 39th ed. 1976).
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Killing rather than capturing a suspect deprives the justice system of the
opportunity to test whether the government has sufficient evidence to
defeat that presumption in court.
V.

CONCLUSION

British security forces have killed more than 160 civilians in Northern
Ireland since 1969.152 Only one member of the security forces has been
convicted of committing a murder while on duty.153 That soldier served
less than three years in prison and returned to service in the British
army."4 No subsequent British government investigation of disputed
killings by the security forces has concluded that a killing constituted
wrongdoing which warranted criminal prosecution for murder. The
British government removed the only 55 investigator who did verge on
reaching that conclusion: John Stalker.1
The almost total failure of the British government to punish members
of the security forces for killing people who instead might have been
arrested suggests that Britain condones such killings. Orders which
several soldiers admitted they received suggests that Britain encourages
them.
Indeed, it can be argued that the presence of British army troops and
quasi-military units like the UDR in Northern Ireland makes the killing of
unarmed civilians inevitable. The primary purpose and training of such
forces are not suited to enforcing law and order; for precisely this reason,
Americans have balked at the idea of using the military to enforce antidrug laws in the United States. As Northern Ireland human rights activist
Oliver Kearney remarked, explaining his lack of faith in the British
government investigations into the shooting deaths, "[sloldiers are trained
to kill. That is their function. When British soldiers in Ireland kill Irish
people they are doing their job.""
Killing criminal suspects without arrest, charge, trial and sentence
constitutes summary execution forbidden by British domestic and
international law. Such killings violate British domestic law because they
use more force than is reasonable in the circumstances to effect an arrest.
Shooting an unarmed person without warning seems unreasonable if the
152. SHOOT TO KILL?, supra note 4, at 10.
153. One other British soldier, Pvt. Robert Davidson, was convicted of manslaughter
and given a 12-month suspended sentence. Davidson fired at a car passing through a
checkpoint at Strabane, North Ireland, and killed a woman passenger. SHOOT TO KILL?,
supra note 4, para. 103, at 80.

154. Id.
155. See generally J. STALKER, supra note 52.
156. Interview with Oliver Kearney, in Antrim, N. Ir. (Feb. 12, 1988).
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object is to arrest him. It seems reasonable only if the object is to kill.
Such killings violate the United Nations International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, to which Britain is subject, because they
arbitrarily deprive persons of their lives. The killings violate the
European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms by depriving persons of their lives intentionally without the
sentence of a court following conviction for a crime for which the death
penalty is provided by law. Britain has no death penalty.
Britain has expressed a desire to instill in Irish nationalists confidence
in the system of government in Northern Ireland. But how can this
confidence be born, much less thrive, when Irish lives can be snuffed out
with impunity?
It has been said that winning the hearts and minds of nationalists
depends on convincing "the little old lady on the Falls Road," a heavily
nationalist area of Belfast. Lest we forget, the little old lady on the Falls
Road is not stupid. It has not escaped her attention that British forces are
killing her neighbors and walking free.

THE BORDER THAT WOULDN'T Go AWAY:
IRISH INTEGRATION IN THE EC
HILARY HOUSE *

This Article examines the role of Ireland' in the European Community (EC)2 in light of the following questions. How do the provisions for
economic cohesion in the original European Economic Community (EEC)
treaty, and the later-developed regional policies of the EC, influence the
prospects for economic integration between Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland? How likely is such integration likely to translate into
some form of political integration between these two regions? How much
has membership in the EC helped the Republic of Ireland reduce its
economic dependence on the United Kingdom? Finally, to what extent
does the Community's framework provide a different context for the
settlement of the "Irish question" in Anglo-Irish affairs?
Section I explores the history of economic integration between North
and South, examining the degree to which cooperation existed before
accession to the EC. In the next section, economic integration since entry
is analyzed, with special emphasis on regional policy, the European
Monetary System and the effect of membership on Anglo-Irish economic
relations. Section III provides a brief background of the political climate
leading up to entry, particularly upon official attitudes towards the border
and the revised view of Irish neutrality. The final section, discussing the
development of political integration since entry, draws some conclusions
about the implications of economic integration for political convergence
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
I. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION BEFORE THE EC

Economic cooperation between the North and the Republic existed
well before either's accession to the EC. Functional cooperation became
• Director, Midwest Office, American Protestants for Truth About Ireland; B.A.,
1986, Sarah Lawrence College; M.A., 1990, University of Wisconsin.
1. The term Ireland is used here when referring together to the Republic of Ireland, or
the South, and Northern Ireland, or the North.
2. In 1967, the institutions of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
established by the Treaty of Paris in 1951, the European Economic Community .(EEC),
established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euroatom), established by a separate Treaty of Rome in 1951, merged to form what now

is known as the European Community. The terms EC and the Community are used here
to refer to this latter entity. D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW & THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 17-18 (4th ed. 1987).
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a distinct possibility in the 1960s following the disastrous Irish Republican
Army (IRA) campaign of 1956-62,' which coincided with the coming to
power in the Republic of an administration characterized by an explicitly
cooperative attitude." Prime Minister Sean Lemass's de facto recognition
of Northern Ireland and the subordination of traditional nationalist
concerns came at a time of impressive economic growth in the South.
The 1960s were indeed a lucrative time for the Republic, with the growth
rate rising from 1.9% to 4.1%, unemployment falling and even the
emigration rate decreasing.'
Although much of this economic progress reflected a Europe-wide
trend, it was also the result of a radical shift in Irish economic policy.
Traditionally, the South's heavy trade dependence on Britain and its
protectionist economic policies were a major obstacle to joining a tarifffree European market.' It was not until the early 1960s that the Republic's attitude toward a European economic union began to change. Massive
emigration, high unemployment and below-average growth throughout the
1950s led many political leaders to realize that protectionism was not
working. 7 Meanwhile, as free trade was discussed in the EEC, the
Republic earnestly began reexamining that economic policy. As a sort of
prelude to membership in the EEC, then, the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area
Agreement (the "Agreement") was established in 1966.' It called for a
gradual removal of industrial tariffs between the Republic and the United
Kingdom and a general loosening of economic protection over a ten-year
period. 9
The agreement marked a turning point in the decline of the economic
significance of the border between North and South. The prospects for
economic integration were mixed. On the one hand, Northern Ireland
appeared to have more in common economically with the Republic than
with Britain. Its dependence upon agriculture and the special needs of the
border regions dictated that cooperation on an all-Ireland basis was more
sensible than reliance upon London to honor promises of economic
development. On the other hand, the two economies are very different.
3. P. KEATINGE, A PLACE AMONG THE NATIONS: ISSUES OF IRISH FOREIGN POLICY 113

(1978).
4. Id.
5. K. KENNEDY & B. DOWLING, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN IRELAND: THE EXPERIENCE
SINCE 1947, at 8 (1975).
6. Salmon, Ireland, in BUILDING EUROPE: BRITAIN'S PARTNERS IN THE EEC 192 (C.
Twitchett & K. Twitchett eds. 1981). From 1948-60, for examplc, 75% of the Republic's
exports went to Britain and 50% of its imports came from there. Id.

7. Id.
8. Id.at 194.
9. Id.at 194-95.
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Northern Ireland claims traditional home industries, such as textiles and
shipbuilding, which are typical of the older European industries which
have declined. The South can boast no such home industries of like
significance; instead, it depends upon a much heavier agricultural output.
Nevertheless, the general trend towards trade liberalization, the free
movement of capital and the attraction of foreign investment created
favorable conditions for Irish entry into the EEC.
Republic attitudes toward a European economic union began to change
in earnest in the 1960s, but were rendered powerless when Britain failed
to join. When Britain finally did join, the Republic immediately followed
suit.'" Due to the South's constitutional claims to sovereignty and its
requirement that all legislative, judicial and executive powers be exercised
by the state,"' a constitutional amendment, and hence a referendum, was
necessary. The amendment to article 29 of the Irish constitution, which
deals with international relations and regulates the treaty-making power of
the state, was adopted by eighty-three percent in a referendum in May
1972.2 The amending clause states that the Republic may become a
member of the EC's three institutions: the EEC, the ECSC and Euroatom.' 3 It further explains that the constitution does not invalidate
anything the state does in fulfilling its Community obligations. 4 In
deference to public concern over Irish neutrality, the amendment carefully
precludes any actual transfer of power to the Community. Nevertheless,
the scope of the amendment is rather wide, covering more, for example,
than the British European Communities Act of 1972. 5 The range of
interpretation possible with respect to the amendment led some to fear that
a ministerial order of an EC Commission decision could override some of
the most fundamental provisions of the Irish constitution.' 6 This has yet
to happen.
Arguments for and against membership were almost purely divided
along economic and political lines. Four categories of arguments which
colored the referendum debate are summarized in Table 1.
10. Id. at 195.
11. See Murphy, The European Comnunity and the Irish Legal System, in IRELAND AND
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: TEN YEARS OF MEMBERSHIP 29-31 (D. Coombes ed. 1983)
[hereinafter IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES].

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 30.
Id.; see supra note 2.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id.; The EC Commission functions as an initiator of Community policy, an

executive agency and a guardian of Community treaties. D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, supra
note 2, at 188.
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Table 1:
Categories of Opinion Regarding Irish Membership in the EEC17
Affiliates

Argument

Conservative
in favor

Fianna FAil, Fine
Gael, Irish Council
of the European
Movement

Inevitable, given Britain's decision to join;
positive economic consequences of entry
versus repercussions of non-entry; Ireland's
share in building a "new Europe"

Conservative
against

Common Market
Study Group

Mostly economic

Left-wing
in favor

Irish Communist
Organization

European integration inevitable stage in
capitalist development; would hasten socialist
revolution

Left-wing
against

Labour Party, 8
Workers' Party,' 9
Communist Party

Sovereignty undermined right away; neutrality, eventually industrial sector, and
small farmers vulnerable; associate membership possible

Since that the pro-Community groups contained some of the most
powerful and influential elements in Irish politics, enjoying the support of
state institutions such as the Department of Foreign Affairs, the cards
were stacked against opposition to membership quite early. More
interesting, however, is the difference in emphasis the two most important
groups, conservative-in-favor and left-wing-against, place on political and
economic concerns. For proponents, only a vague reference to participation in the construction of a new Europe could be cited as a political
argument in favor of joining;' otherwise, the concentration is on the
17. Coakley, The European Dimension in Irish Public Opinion 1972-82, in IRELAND
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITES, supra note 11, at 50-51.
18. Salmon, supra note 6, at 200. The Labour Party, once in power in a coalition
government with Fine Gael, eventually changed its role from an opponent of membership
to that of a "constructive critic." Id. at 203.
19. Known as Official Sinn Fin at the time. Id.
20. Coakley, supra note 17, at 50.
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economic benefits of joining and, perhaps more importantly, the consequences of not joining. 2 At the time of accession, the Republic's two
biggest parties believed that industry would benefit from multinational
corporate investment as membership rendered the country more attractive
to foreign investors.2 Higher prices would be paid for Irish goods and
dependence on the British market would be reduced as more markets
became available for the Republic's products. The left, on the other hand,
while pointing out the vulnerability of certain sectors to a common
European market and the effects of market integration, primarily stressed
political factors, such as the abrogation of sovereignty and the threat to the
tradition of Irish neutrality that a possible European defense policy would
pose.'
Recognizing that pure isolationism was an outmoded and
dangerous economic policy, the left preferred Sweden's solution.
II. ECONOMIC

INTEGRATION SINCE THE

EC

Regional policy on the Community level was not included in the
original Treaty of Rome, but the case for one had essentially been made
by the late 1960s.1 Enlargement and recession exacerbated regional
disparities to the extent that economic and social cohesion assumed a more
urgent meaning after the accession of the Republic in 1973. The common
market of agriculture was a mixed blessing for less-developed regions in
Europe. On the one hand, the price support system tended to ameliorate
their heavy dependence on agriculture. On the other, the true beneficiaries were larger producers and wealthier regions whose output was greater
and who were better able to specialize in well-supported products.
As "priority regions" in the EC, Northern Ireland and the Republic
of Ireland are major recipients of its structural funds.'5 These are the
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund
and The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund.' In

21. Salmon, supra note 6, at 198.
22. See id.

23. See id.at 215.
24. Laffan, 'While You're Over There in Brussels, Get Us a Grant': The Managemnent
of the Structural Funds in Ireland, in 4 IRISH POUTICAL STUDIES 43 (J. Coakley & N. Rees
eds. 1989); see infra note 76 and accompanying text.
25. IRISH SOCIAL & ECONOMIC RESEARCH UNIT, 1992: WHAT IT MEANS FOR IRELAND,
Pamphlet No. 1, at 12 (1990) [hereinafter 1992: WHAT IT MEANS FOR IRELAND].
26. See idat 11-13.
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1986, the Republic's receipts from the Community27 budget represented
fourteen percent of the country's entire budget.28 Likewise, the United
Kingdom's Regional Development Plan for Northern Ireland (1989-1993)
seeks £685 million in Community aid to fund projects directed at
improving image, infrastructure and expertise in Northern Ireland.' Of
particular relevance to these two regions is the Community's interest in
cross-border projects and the availability of Community funds as an
impartial source of revenue to finance functional North-South integration.' These projects include the financing of joint drainage programs
in border areas (1979) and a five-year plan for the use of funds from the
non-quota section of the ERDF for cross-border projects (1980-85).31
These developments may be seen as accelerating the pace of economic
integration between the two areas.
Regional policy was institutionalized by the Single European Act
(SEA),32 and many have argued that the act, in theory at least, provides

for an extension of regional policy and an official commitment by the EC
to tackle the Republic's problems of spatial disparity.33 Title V, inserted
at the insistence of Southern Irish and Greek members, outlines an
obligation to coordinate economic policies to strengthen economic and
There is little in the act,
social cohesion and reduce disparities.'
regional convergence has
regarding
new
anything
that
suggest
to
however,
been added, beyond the commitment to coordinate national economic
policies and an intention to amend the rules of the structural funds.
Michael Cuddy argues that this does not bode well for less-developed
regions for two reasons. First, any move toward convergence, if it is to
be effective, must involve significant economic transfers from wealthier

27.

Laffan, supra note 24, at 49.

28. Id.
29. Borooah, Regional Development Plan for Northern Ireland, in 4 IRISH POLITICAL
STUDIES, supra note 24, at 112.
30. Id.; see also 1992: WHAT IT MEANS FOR IRELAND, supra note 25, at 15.
31. 1992: WHAT IT MEANS FOR IRELAND, supra note 25, at 15.
32. See Single European Act, reprinted in EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMM'N,
BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 23 (Supp. 2/86) (1986).
33. Cuddy, PeripheralRegions, Enlargement and the Impact of EC Policies, in THE
FUTURE OF REGIONAL POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: ITS IMPLUCATION FOR

IRELAND 16-17 (M.P. Cuddy & T.A. Boylan eds. 1987); see also D. Coombes, The
Politics of Scale: European Economic Integration, Spatial Disparity and Local Development
(May 25, 1989) (address to the Inaugural Conference of the European Community Studies

Association, Fairfax, Va.).
34. Single European Act, supra note 32, tit. V.
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to poorer regions.33 At this time, there is no political consensus behind
the need for this; the advocacy of income redistribution goes no farther
than national boundaries. 6 Second, notwithstanding a political commitment to provide sufficient funds for regional development, the finances for
such a venture are conspicuously absent.37 Without the means, the
38 aim
of economic and monetary union will be more difficult to achieve.
Regional development for Northern Ireland is aimed at alleviating the
economic problems caused by the decline in older traditional industries
and the concentration of agriculture. 39 Unemployment in Northern
Ireland is twice the United Kingdom average; incomes are low, as is gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita, and the birth rate exceeds that of the
United Kingdom as a whole.' Unemployment in agriculture is 8%, as
opposed to 2.3% for the United Kingdom. 4 ' The agricultural climate is
not conducive to diversification, and the reforms of the Community's
Common Agricultural Policy have impacted significantly on the North's
concentration on milk, beef and sheep.42 In industry, the North has been
dependent on a number of traditional industries which have been in
decline.43 As a result, unemployment in the manufacturing sector has
risen." Moreover, the United Kingdom's early industrialization leaves
it with an old infrastructure desperately in need of revitalization.45
Responding to these problems, the United Kingdom submitted to the
EC Commission its Regional Development Plan for Northern Ireland
(1989-1993).'
Table 2 outlines some of the salient aspects of the plan
on an annual expenditure basis.

35. Cuddy, supra note 33, at 7, 17.
36. Dickson, Cross-Border Shoppers 'Cost Dublin I£40M,' Fin. Times (London), Feb.

22, 1990, at 1, col. 7.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Borooah, supra note 29, at Il1.
40. See id. at 111.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 111-12.
46. Id.

[Vol. I11

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

Table 2:
Expenditure in the Regional Development Planfor Northern Ireland
Object of
Expenditure

Image

Amount of
Expenditure loom
(in £)
Areas of
Concern

Infrastructure

Expertise

Exports and Enterprise

340m

50m

195m

management
and labor
skills

private sector, industrial
development, rural
economy, tourism,
education

communications,
community
reconciliation, public utilities,
social facilities
environment,
urban renewal

Note that this plan does not deal at all with cross-border cooperation. The
emphasis here is on developing the potential of Northern Ireland's
economy, as evidenced by the concentration of funds going to infrastructure. Northern Ireland's regional fund receipts have less of an effect,
however, than pure numbers might suggest. This is so because the British
government has failed to adopt the principle of "additionality," which
states that any Community funds contributing to national development
plans must be used as an additional source of revenue over and above
money from the national governments themselves. 47 Instead, London has
replaced what it would have contributed to Northern Irish development
with Community funds, thus nullifying any additional impact such revenue
might have had. 4" Furthermore, this refusal to implement additionality
makes it especially difficult to assess what influence, if any, Community
regional policy has on Northern Irish development. 4
The Republic of Ireland as a whole is considered a region for
Community purposes. It has the second fastest-rising unemployment
(behind Spain), a GDP which is seventy percent of the Community
average and an economy highly dependent on agriculture.' From 1978
to 1980 it received the highest per capita transfers from the European
Community's structural funds.51 It represents a special situation within
the Community's regional policy, since, like Portugal and Greece, the
47.

1992: WHAT IT MEANS FOR IRELAND, supra note 25, at 14.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 11.
Laffan, supra note 24, at 49.
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entire country is treated as one region. 2 The implications of this
treatment for the implementation of regional policy are twofold. First, the
central government is, in effect, the "regional authority" through which
funds are managed. Therefore, the involvement by local authorities in
addition to central government supervision, something which the
Commission has repeatedly encouraged, is rendered meaningless in the
Republic's case. Second, the Irish government, because it acts above and
not with regional actors, is more concerned with national economic
development than with internal regional disparities. Under this centralized
management of funds, receipts are given a separate budget heading in the
Public Capital Programme and are allocated on a sectoral, rather than
regional, basis.
The two parts of the island, then, are primarily concerned with the
national impact of the Community's regional policy-the Republic with
national economic development as a form of regional development and
Northern Ireland with its particular problems of traditional industry decline
and its status as a region within the United Kingdom. A more pressing
problem from an all-Ireland perspective, however, is the enlargement of
the EC in the 1980s to include Greece, Spain and Portugal. Although,
from an Irish perspective, one could view enlargement positively as the
addition of new member states with similar concerns regarding economic
divergence (and hence new allies at Brussels), it is more realistic to
assume that the energy of these new members will be directed at accruing
maximum benefits to themselves. Their accession, moreover, adds a
Mediterranean dimension to the EC, increasing the competition for
resources, shifting the focus of regional policy to the southern periphery
of the EC and imposing additional budgetary constraints on an already
tight Community budget.
The outlook for the impact of the EC on economic integration between
the Republic and Northern Ireland is, at best, mixed. Cross-border
cooperation existed well before membership in the EC; the possibility of
it increasing as a result of membership is not evident. For example,
Seamus Mallon of the Social Democratic Labour Party, one of the major
nationalist parties in Northern Ireland, complained recently that in Newry
(which happens to be, by the way, a border town) the only building to go
up in the last two years was an expensive customs station. He called on
those working on the cross-border cooperation to stop carrying out
expensive, time-consuming "feasibility studies" and take some definite
action on cross-border cooperation."
Thus far, the only significant
border collaboration that has occurred in Ireland is in the security arena
52. See D. Coombes, supra note 33, at 21.
53. Shanahan, North-South Links Vial for EC Aid, Says MP, Ir. Times (Dublin), Mar.
1, 1990, at 6, col. 1.
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which in no way can be said to promote integration of any kind.
There are other limits to economic integration between the North and
South that are directly related to the EC. The most evident demonstration
of this is the Republic's decision to join the European Monetary System
(EMS) in 1978, despite Britain's explicit intention to stay out of it. While
the optimistic view held that this breaking of ranks with the British
constituted a clear assertion of the Republic's independence,54 the fact
remained that participation in EMS without the United Kingdom would
result in exchange controls between the Republic and the North. The
trend towards economic integration would thus be reversed as the
economic division of Ireland was reinforced rather than eroded. Under
such a scenario, the border would not simply go away.
The EC can, however, contribute meaningfully to the elimination of
the economic border in Ireland, as was shown in the Commission's
opposition to the "Buy Irish" campaign of January 1978." 5 This
campaign, in which the Republic promoted home sales of Irish goods
through advertisements and "Guaranteed Irish" symbols, was found by the
European Court of Justice to violate the Republic's obligations under the
The court held that activities attributable to the
Treaty of Rome.'
government of a member state which encourage purchase of domestic
products through a national advertising campaign and the administration
of special procedures which discriminate against or exclude imports
constitute measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions
on imports. 7
In a related case, the Commission, strongly backed by Britain,
successfully challenged the Dublin government's "48-hour rule," which
was introduced in April 1987 to restrict duty and tax free allowances to
travelers who have stayed more than 48 hours in another country and have
evidence to that effect."8 The European Court of Justice found that the
rule defied the Republic's Community obligations."9 The Republic's high
value-added tax (VAT) and Northern Ireland's relatively low one, have led
54. One observer has even gone so far as to say that "participation in EMS marked that
final stage of the Irish independence struggle." Salmon, supra note 6, at 212.
55. Re "Buy-Irish" Campaign: European Comm. Comm'n v. Ireland, 1982 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 4005, [19831 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 104; see also Murray, Intenational
Agreements: 'Buy Irish' Campaign Violates Treaty of Rome-Comm'n of the European
Communities v. Ireland, 24 HARV. INT'L L.J. 205 (1983).

56. Re "Buy-Irish" Campaign: European Comm. Comm'n v. Ireland, 1982 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 4005, [1983] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 104.
57. Id.
58. Re Border Shopping: European Comm. Comm'n v. Ireland, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 103.
59. Id.
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to "shopping sprees" in the North that have cost the South an estimated
Ir £40 million a year.6'
The implications of these developments are obviously of economic
importance for the South, but their political significance poses some
interesting questions about Community membership and the prospects for
political integration.

111.

THE POLITICAL CLIMATE BEFORE ENTRY

While much attention deservedly has been paid to the economic reason
and consequences of Community membership for Ireland, the political
reasons and consequences should not be ignored. At the same time,
however, they should not be overemphasized. As a founding member of
the Council of Europe, for example, the Republic has long had a European
dimension to its political and economic outlook. In addition, its tradition
of Catholicism and its historical antagonism towards Great Britain have
given it a more continental orientation. Just as there were economic
obstacles to joining the EC, however, there were political hindrances as
well. Its fragile status as a young nation, during the early years of
European integration, was often cited among reasons against joining. As
a newly independent nation, the Republic was reluctant to subject herself
to a new "domination of [its] affairs by outside force."61 Furthermore,
the persistent territorial dispute with Britain led some political leaders to
assert that "[plartition nullifies the usefulness of our efforts [to join]. "62
The final establishment of the Republic's independence, with the
declaration of the Republic in 1948, marked the beginning of the decline
of partition as an immediately urgent issue.' The goal of Irish unity was
no longer regarded as attainable in the near future; as a result, the
importance of day-to-day welfare began to take center stage.' Increasingly, elections were won on the ability to implement economic policies
which the electorate perceived necessary, not on one's ability to secure
and protect Irish unity and independence, and even less on one's role in
the War of Independence.' This lasted throughout the difficult, protectionist fifties and did not end with the coming to power of a radically
60. Dickson, supra note 36, at 1, col. 7. After negotiations with Community officials,
the Dublin government agreed to amend its rule to 24 hours. Parkin, Dublin Amends
'Shopping Trips' Ban, Press. A. Newsfile, Dec. 18, 1990.
61.

Salmon, supra note 6, at 191.

62.

Id.

63. P. SHARP, IRISH FOREIGN POLCY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 8 (1990).
64. Id. at 67-89.
65. See Coakley, supra note 17, at 49.
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different government in 1959, led by Sean Lemass. For Lemass found
himself in a predicament that was becoming increasingly common
internationally: a tension between securing domestic political legitimacy
(traditionally based on the independence struggle) and the effectiveness of
one's country in an economically interdependent world (associated
primarily with economic concerns).
Since Lemass's time, the emphasis has been on the latter, as
successive governments have sought to make the Irish public more
receptive to the challenges of economic interdependence. ' This has been
accomplished in part by diverting attention away from the politically
divisive issues of partition and neutrality. Thus, " [M]embership of the EC
was presented by the government as an economic, external affairs matter.
In so far as it became a foreign policy issue, it did so on the initiative of
the political opposition."67 There was no talk of the importance of
playing a role in the international political arena, as there had been, for
example, in discussions of the Republic's role in the United Nations. In
fact, "even the issue of Partition was approached by a 'depoliticized'
functionalism which attempted to disown the utility of the political symbols
and assumptions of the past in favour of a new 'rationality' of economic
growth and development." 6" The key issue surrounding membership was
that the Republic's had little choice in the matter. Although global tariff
reductions and the development of a European common market posed
problems for a small nation thus far accustomed primarily to protectionist
economic policies, it was seen as inevitable that the Republic would have
to join the movement toward European free trade. Meanwhile, as
neutrality was seen as unthreatened (since European defense did not yet
figure significantly into the picture), the participation of the Republic in
the defense of Europe was viewed in government circles as inevitable, if
and when it became necessary.' The shift in attitude towards partition
and neutrality before entry, in retrospect, was a clear sign of the times
ahead.
IV.

THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Proponents of Community membership on both sides of the border
(the Social Democratic Labour Party in the North and both Fianna FAil
and Fine Gael in the Republic) are hopeful that economic integration will
eventually translate into political integration and somehow satisfy
66. Id.
67.

P. SHARP, supra note 63, at 79.

68. Id. at 79.
69. P. KEATINGE, A SINGULAR STANCE: IRISH NEUTRAIUTY IN THE 1980s, at 24-29
(1984); see also Salmon, supra note 6, at 193.
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aspirations towards Irish unification. 7 Meanwhile, in certain nationalist
circles (but by no means all) on both sides of the border, "[tihe optimistic
view prevalent at the time of accession saw the prospects of greater
economic and political integration in the Community framework as
offering a new and more fruitful perspective for resolving the problems
created by partition." 1 To a certain extent this optimism has been
Patrick Keatinge looks upon the European Council as
rewarded.
"institutionalized multilateral summitry ...[which] leads in turn to more
bilateral summit meeting with 'third parties' which may provide opportuniAs an example, he
ties for promoting the small state's position."'
points to the March 1981 meeting between Prime Minister Charles
Haughey and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in which the latter
advocated treating the Northern Ireland question as an international
issue.' That has yet to happen. Margaret Thatcher's objection to the
appointment of a rapporteur of a report on the political, social and
economic situation in Ireland in March 1983'4 signaled that the British
government was not willing to tolerate any Community initiatives on
partition. In addition, the reunification of Germany has absorbed all the
energies of the German government, while nearly exclusively commanding
the political attention of the other member states.
In the South, meanwhile, the shift in attitude toward partition over
time has been tremendous, as the following example illustrates. In 1957,
the demand being placed on the Soviet Union to hold a plebiscite on the
reunification of Germany was cited by an Irish government official as the
one development in Europe that held significance for Irish partition, in
that it inspired hope that the "same principle would be applied to
Ireland."' 5 In contrast, an official from the same party, Prime Minister
70. Who's for Partition?, fr. Times (Dublin), May 16, 1987, at I1,col. 1 (editorial).
Indeed, this was one of the arguments used to promote accession and the primary reason
behind loyalist opposition to it. See generally Coakley, supra note 17, at 50-51. With the
end of Stormont in 1972 and the entry into the EC in 1973, Northern Irish loyalists were
fearful of a threat to the entire existence of "their" state. See KEATINGE, supra note 69,
at 80.
71. Coombes, Ireland's Membership of the European Community: Strange Paradox of
Mere Expedience?, in IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 11, at 19.
72. Keatinge, An Odd Couple? Obstacles and Opportunities in Inter-State Political
Cooperation Between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, in POLITICAL
COOPERATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIEs 323 (D. Rea ed. 1982).
73.

Id.

74. O'Cleireacain; Northern Ireland and Irish Integration: The Role of the European
Communities, 22 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 108 (1983).
75. See Sharp, External Challenges and Domestic Policy Legitimacy: Ireland's Foreign
Policy 1983-7, in 4 IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES, supra note 24, at 79; infra note 101 and
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Haughey, recently stated on United States television that the present
reunification of Germany could have serious implications for Northern
Ireland.76 He, however, explicitly referred to the divisions between the
people of Northern Ireland, not partition.'
The signing of the SEA by the member states was seen by many as
a strong antidote to the negative perceptions of the future of political
cooperation. While titles I, II and IV of the act provide anew for
economic and monetary cohesion and common social policies, title III
deals with political cooperation, or the prospects for a European foreign
policy. 7" For example, it calls on members to "endeavour jointly to
formulate and implement a European foreign policy"79 through consultation with other members, 8' taking the positions of other members into
account when formulating national positions8 ' and generally making
national foreign policy with the goal of a common European foreign policy
in mind.'
Raymond Crotty brought a case before the Irish Supreme Court
seeking an amendment to the constitution prior to Irish ratification (which
would require a referendum) and in doing so posed the following
controversial questions to the electorate.'
What is the future of the
Republic's constitutional claim to territorial control over the entire island,
which is thought by many to be the basis for Irish sovereignty?' What
is the future of the Republic's long-established position of military
neutrality, in which it remains committed to refraining from joining in any
military alliance with the United Kingdom as long as partition is in
place?8 5 The provisions of title III of the SEA, being as they are part of
an international treaty, were found to necessitate an amendment before
ratification because they "set the High Contracting Parties [member states]
accompanying text.
76. MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour: News Maker: Charles Haughey (PBS television
broadcast, Mar. 1, 1990) (transcript on file at the office of the N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &

COMP. L.).
77. Id.
78. Sherlock, Constitutional Law-Sovereignty, the Constitution and the Single European
Act, 9 DUBLIN U.L.J. 103 (1987).

79. Single European Act, supra note 32, art. 30, sec. 1.
80. Id. see. 2(a).
81.

Id. sec. 2(c).

82. Id.
83.

Crotty v. An Taoiseach, [19871 I.L.R.M. 400.

84.

Id.

85. Id.
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on a path leading to eventual European union in foreign policy. ", The
majority opinion of the court held that "to regard Title III as merely
formalizing existing practices and procedures was to underestimate the
nature of a treaty in international law as distinct from mere practice or
procedure . . . Tide III required changes which would erode national

independence in the context of external relations. " "
The outcome of the referendum was virtually predestined. As was the
case with the referendum concerning membership in 1972, a "yes" vote
was encouraged by a coalition of most of the major parties, namely Fine
Gael, Fianna Fgil and the newly formed Progressive Democrats.8" The
Labour Party was split on the issue, although its leader campaigned for a
"yes" vote. The "no" vote, meanwhile, was supported by a variety of
groups, many with different and sometimes contradicting motives and
goals, which were very difficult to unite under any form of umbrella
organization. For example, the Society for the Protection of the Unborn,
concerned that the SEA would force the South to legalize abortion, found
itself in alliance with the Sinn Fin and the Workers' Party. 89
The government and other supporters of a "yes" vote claimed that the
Republic would be kicked out of the EC if the SEA were rejected.'
Although this was untrue-the SEA was renegotiable and a simple
amendment to it would have addressed most of the problems of Irish
ratification-the public was sufficiently concerned about the economic
consequences of a "no" vote and ambiguous enough about their feelings
towards neutrality to vote "yes." In fact, the SEA vote, despite loudly
voiced reservations about neutrality, was overwhelmingly in favor;
however, people voted for the SEA not because they did not care about
neutrality, but because they did care about the perceived economic
interests of membership. 91 Neutrality is still politically very popular;
indeed, all the major parties went to great lengths to claim that the SEA
did not threaten neutrality. The political leadership's ambivalence towards
defense cooperation, then, continues to reflect the ambiguous public
opinion towards it. As neutrality becomes more of an issue within the
86. Id.
87. Id.
88.

See generally Salmon, supra note 6, at 202.

89. See generally Faolain, Ranelagh-A Good Place to Conclude, Ir. Times (Dublin),
May 20, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
90. See generally Carroll, O'Malley and Crotty Clash on Issue of EEC Membership, Ir.
Times (Dublin), May 6, 1987, at 9, col. 1,in which Desmond O'Mallcy, leader of the
Progressive Democrats, stated that a "'no' vote will effcctivcly put us out of the
community"; see also Carroll, 'No' Vote Could Lead Ireland Out of EEC, Haughey Warns,

Ir. Times (Dublin), May 13, 1987, at 4, col. 1.
91.

P. SHARP, supra note 63, at 199-232.
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European context in the 1980s-first with the London Conference and the
Genschler-Colombo proposals of 1981, the Solemn Declaration of 1983
and now with the SEA-the governments of the Republic have sought to
assuage domestic concern by de-emphasizing the country's historic
military neutrality, while repeatedly reassuring the people that it was in no
way threatened.' By stressing that the Republic was not, and never had
been, politically neutral, and that its political, economic and cultural
interests lay in the West, leaders have hoped to convince the public that
neutrality was not a right, but a privilege; one that an increasingly
economically interdependent world may force them to do without.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although they share the dubious distinction of being less-developed
regions, the Republic and Northern Ireland share little else as members of
the European Community. Writing in 1983, Seamus O'Cleireaclain was
very optimistic that the convergence of Dublin-Belfast economic interests,
coinciding with the growing divergence of Dublin-London economic
interests, would enhance the possibility of "common Irish positions"
within the EC.'
Britain's continued stance towards the EMS and the
Republic's implementation of the "48-hour rule" are just two among the
more striking examples that this optimism is unlikely to be rewarded.
Even though the Republic has been forced to abandon the rule, developments such as these are a significant warning that it will be extremely
difficult to convince national governments of the economic and political
worth of abandoning a large part of their power to implement national
economic policy.
The prospects for political integration, as a result of some sort of
spillover from economic integration, are even less likely. First, there
must be some sort of political consensus behind such a development before
it is likely to occur. This is clearly absent in the Irish case. Second, the
Irish border is one of the most politically volatile borders in Western
Europe. The efforts to downplay the political significance of the border
in the 1960s in order to create a more favorable environment for
investment in Ireland did not succeed in diminishing opposition to
partition. Similarly, the economic benefits to be accrued from an
economically borderless Ireland in no way suggest that the political import
of the Irish border is likely to fade. Finally, the signing of the AngloIrish Agreement at Hillsborough in 1985 has led to a strengthening of
92. Id. at 199-232; see also Hogan, Senator Says SEA Posters May Contradict Court,
Ir. Times (Dublin), May 20, 1987, at 6, col. 1; 'Misleading' Claims on Neutrality, Ir.
Times (Dublin), May 20, 1987, at 6, col. I.
93. O'Cleireacain, supra note 74, at 108-09.
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cross-border security cooperation, and hence a clear reinforcement of the
political aspect of the border.
Faith in the EC to "resolve" the problem of partition without actually
removing partition is clearly overoptimistic. Despite high expectations,
Community membership has had very little impact upon North-South
relations, and even less of one on partition particularly. This is so
because, as an issue, partition has for the most part been omitted from the
Community agenda and has instead been addressed as it has always
unsuccessfully been-the bilateral contest. The logic behind believing that
the "problems created by partition" could be resolved merely by placing
them in a European context is difficult to understand. Political integration, far from being enhanced by membership, rather has been rendered
irrelevant.
The greatest obstacle to Irish integration resulting from Community
membership lies in the many paradoxes of the Republic's accession and
activities at the European level, which obscure the issue of Irish membership and prevent other issues from being addressed in a coherent manner.
The following examples will suffice to clarify this observation. A
Community milk surplus, amounting to almost one-quarter of the total
production by the end of 1983, prompted the Commission to impose a
super-levy on surplus production.' The Republic, with its strong
agricultural sector, opposed the measure.' Negotiations followed which
resulted in a grant to the Republic of a long derogation from the proposal." Two arguments were used to plead its case. First, it complained
that the "quota" system being proposed acted against the free market
principles of the EC.97 This argument downplayed national concerns by
stressing the importance of the logic of market integration. The second
argument insisted that the Republic, with its small proportion of Community production and high proportion of dairy industry in its own economy,
was a special case." By showing that its predicament was a result of
their dependent and colonial relationship with Britain, the Republic
managed to be quite convincing. This argument, meanwhile, highlighted
national concerns without downplaying them, and was likely intended for
a domestic audience.
One author has surmised that "so long as Irish governments can
demonstrate that substantial and unambiguous economic benefits flowed
from membership of the EC, then the latter's price in terms of the
94. Sharp, supra note 75, at 90.
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challenges it poses to established notions of Irish independence can be
managed."' On an economic level, this statement can be extended to
include established notions of Irish sovereignty in regards to economic
policymaking. The threats that membership poses in terms of governmental authority to impose measures aimed at economic development, at
avoiding policies which may undermine the economic well-being of
Ireland, have forced the Dublin governments to straddle the line between
unequivocally defending the Republic's immediate economic interests and
fulfilling its obligations as a member of the EC. The public has continued
to straddle the line as well. In 1979, Eurobarometer #11, one of a series
of Community public opinion polls, revealed that while most of the Irish
(72%) voted for members of European Parliament based on the candidates' European ideas rather than their party affiliation, of those, 62% felt
that Irish MEPs should always give Irish interests higher priority than
Community interest.1 "0
Nevertheless, during its presidency of the
Community's Council in 1975 and 1979, "the Irish position shrewdly put
less emphasis on defending those Community policies inclined to benefit
Ireland materially . . . than on encouraging the Community's general
development. "101
Table 3 shows how the change in emphasis in official Irish nationalism has enabled the republican-based political legitimacy of Irish
government to survive the move towards European union.
Table 3:
Transformation of Irish Nationalist Ideas in the 20th Century
Isolationist Tendencies

Integrationist Tendencies

Preoccupation with partition-

The EC as a new alliance which would
bring North and South closer together

Economic protectionism and
maximization of autonomy-

Membership would make it easier to
break out of the political and economic
dependence on Britain

Nationalism and integration have been able to coexist because the Irish
people have allowed them to coexist; but the question remains: How long
will the EC allow them to coexist?
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